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THE MYTH OF DIVINE LAW IN SECULAR SOCIETY
Rabbi Burton L. Visotzky*
During the first six centuries of the Common Era,' the rabbis-who
were a minority (academics) within a minority (the Jews)-arrogated
for themselves the right to determine what they considered to be di-
vine law for their followers.2 Because such a powerless minority
within the larger culture was willing to do just that should serve as a
warning to us today. There are religious movements within this coun-
try that seek to impose their version of divine law upon the majority
of citizens of this republic. The author, a professor of rabbinic litera-
ture at the Jewish Theological Seminary, calls for a strong separation
between church and state.3
INTRODUCTION
It seems to me impossible to address the Center for Church/State
Studies without reference to our beloved First Amendment. Allow
me to begin, then, by noting that the last Congress, and all the more
so, the current 4 almost evenly divided Congress, have been notable for
their strong attention to the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Congress' careful consideration of the First Amend-
ment has been best signified by their particular focus on the first five
words of our Bill of Rights: "Congress shall make no law."'5
* Nathan and Janet Appleman Chair in Midrash and Interreligious Studies, Jewish Theologi-
cal Seminary of America.
1. That is from approximately 70 C.E. to about 600 C.E. The author uses the abbreviation for
Common Era in preference to the Christian calendar designation of A.D., anno domini. B.C.E.
stands for Before the Common Era.
2. See the introduction and bibliography to Burton L. Visotzky, The Literature of the Rabbis.
in FROM MESOPOTAMIA TO MODERNITY: TEN INTRODUCrIONS TO JEWISH HISTORY AND LITER-
ATURE 71-102 (Burton L. Visotzky & David E. Fishman eds., 1999)[hereinafter MESOPOTAMIA].
3. The following is an essay produced from the eighteenth annual Church/State lecture that
the author delivered at DePaul College of Law on March 1, 2001.
4. That is the Congress elected in 1998 as opposed to the current Congress elected in Novem-
ber, 2000.
5. I fear that by the end of the current Congress, I and others of similar liberal leanings will be
grateful that the current Republican Congress and executive branch accomplished as little as
possible. It is essential to hang the shingle of my bias early in this article, lest those unfamiliar
with rabbinic literature have difficulty discerning my socio-political Weltanschauung.
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For the moment, I will eschew further reference to American polit-
ics and jurisprudence and speak, instead, about a topic where I actu-
ally have some standing: ancient rabbinic Judaism.6 The subject of
this essay is "The Myth of Divine Law in Secular Society," which may
require some parsing and definition. By "Myth," I do not mean false-
hood or fable. Rather, "Myth" refers to the story or narrative that a
culture hands down, which provides a foundation for its self-defini-
tion. In our current context, myth refers to the narrative of the now
famous phrase "Nomos and Narrative," coined by Robert Cover in
the Harvard Law Review. 7 My own academic specialty in rabbinic
literature is not Nomos, which is law, but rather is focused on rabbinic
narrative. Of course rabbinic society was a culture of laws, which
means that rabbinic narratives that recounted the lives of the rabbinic
saints8 shed bright light on its citizens' attitudes towards law.
"Secular society" also needs some definition. Americans generally
refer to their own culture as a "secular society," even as they admit
that it is based on a "Protestant ethic" or a "Judeo-Christian" ethos.
The latter phrase is a post-Holocaust nod from the ecumenically
minded Christians to the Jews. Prior to World War II, we called our-
selves a Christian culture. There are many today, even in government,
who would like to revert this nation to "Christian" culture. 9 What,
then, does "secular society" mean in a rabbinic sense?
First and foremost, this article refers to "secular society" in the
rabbinic era. If one does not happen to study rabbinic literature, the
"rabbinic era" is often referred to as the Later Roman Empire' o or
Late Antiquity." For the purposes of this article, the rabbinic period
extends into the early Byzantine era, particularly focusing on rabbinic
culture in the Mediterranean world, circa 70-600 of the Common Era.
6. The preeminent Jewish culture of the first centuries of the common era. See MESOPOTA-
MIA, supra note 2.
7. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). Cover
places nomos, the law, within the context of the narrative or myth of a culture. The narrative
thus sustains or undermines the rule of law (nomos) in society.
8. Saints not in the formal Catholic sense, but rather that these rabbis had lives invented for
them to illustrate the didactic points the rabbis wished to transmit in their stories.
9. Although they mean something very different than what was meant pre-world War II. Cur-
rent invocation of "Christian" has strong evangelical and conservative overtones. Prior to World
War II, "Christian" referred to liberal Protestantism.
10. See, e.g., J. B. BURY, HISTORY OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE FROM THE DEATH OF THE-
010SIUS I. TO THE DEATH OF JUSTINIAN (A.D. 395 TO A.D. 565)(Macmillan & Co. 1958)(1923).
11. PETER BROWN, THE MAKING OF LATE ANTIQUITY (1978).
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During the period from the destruction of the Second Temple in
Jerusalem (at the hands of the pagan Romans) 12 through the rise of
Christianity and up to the cusp of the Muslim conquest, rabbinic Juda-
ism flourished in two great centers: the Land of Israel 13 and
Babylonia. 14 In these two great loci of rabbinic culture, the rabbis-
types of eastern, parochial, hellenistic philosophers-composed a
great corpus of literature that had as its backbone an enormous com-
plexity of law and ritual. 15 Without a doubt, the rabbis of that era felt
that the laws they promulgated and the behaviors and rituals they reg-
ulated were human manifestations of divine intent. In other words,
what the rabbis preached and practiced was, for them, "divine law."
Understanding this phenomenon is the subject of this Article.
However, I still must explain that the rabbis in the Realpolitik of first
Roman and later Christian hegemony (and the same holds true, to a
varying degree, of Babylonia under Sassanid rule) had very little na-
tional political power. To these rabbis, the pagan, polytheistic rulers
of Rome were "secular" rulers. Because they were not monotheists,
those often-pious pagans had no divine authority and, indeed, they
were often perceived by the rabbis (even as they may have collabo-
rated with Roman authority) as the enemies of God. Although it is
not polite to say this in mixed company, the rabbis were also not con-
vinced that Christian Rome necessarily spoke with divine authority
either. They, too, were perceived as enemies of God rather than as
bearers of divine law.
It must be understood at the outset that for rabbinic Judaism, what
was perceived to be secular society afforded very little real power for
the enforcement of divine law. Under such circumstances, the notion
of divine law only extends God's hegemony to those places where
Jews voluntarily submitted to rabbinic authority. While it is true that
these communities were often close-knit, it is also the case that many
Jews chose to assimilate, observe non-rabbinic forms of religious prac-
tice, and even to convert. Only at the end of this period did the
Church even begin to assert sufficient political clout to legally restrict
Jews to the authority of their ancestral laws. 16 Even then, conversion
to Christianity was always held out as an option.
12. This Temple stood atop Mount Moriah in Jerusalem and was the locus of the Levitical
sacrificial cult from the 6th century B.C.E. until its destruction by the Roman legions in 70 C.E.
13. Also known as Roman Palestine.
14. Also known as the Sassanian Empire or the Fertile Crescent, and known today as Iraq.
15. See Burton L. Visotzky, The Literature of the Rabbis, in MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 2.
16. AMNON LINDER, THE JEWS IN ROMAN IMPERIAL LEGISLATION (1987).
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Before detailing what divine law meant within the confines of the
rabbinic community, allow me to preview my themes so that the impli-
cations of this article's thesis are apparent from the outset. I will ar-
gue that the rabbis arrogated the right to determine divine law for
themselves. This assumption of the mantle of divine intention gave
the rabbis power within the narrow confines of their own communi-
ties. As it happens, that power was diffused among many members of
the rabbinic elite. We must remember that the Jewish world was a
relatively small and powerless minority of the greater secular society.
My thesis is that because religious authority does arrogate the right to
determine divine will within religious comunities, and because the
myth or narrative of promoting divine will is a powerful and profound
one, the ability of religious authorities-particularly powerful
majoritarian religious authorities-to unduly influence secular society
at large is an awesome and possibly dangerous ability. It is in the best
interest of the larger "secular society" to insulate itself as strongly as
possible from the influences of "the myth of divine law." Fortunately,
in American society, there is such insulation in the form of our consti-
tutional wall of separation.
To return to the ancient world, for those Jews who did submit to
rabbinic authority, the rabbis regulated their lives in accordance with
divine law-with the notable exceptions of death and taxes. The
rabbis had no power to inflict capital punishment, nor did they pre-
clude their flock from paying Roman taxes. 17 Nevertheless, rabbis ad-
judicated torts disputes and other civil actions, they regulated a
dizzying array of ritual proscriptions, and they generally enforced the
minutiae attendant to the notion of self-government or home rule. 18
But they did so always with the unspoken (and, for the rabbis, un-
happy) proviso that Jews could and did opt out of the system. The
situation then was not all that different than it is today in twenty-first
century America. Rabbis and their communities lived their lives in
accordance with their own notions of divine law, but did so within the
context of a secular society that also made its demands upon them,
however minimal.
17. The former is a rather clear-cut conscription of rabbinic power-Rome simply would not
allow a rabbinic court to execute. The matter of taxes is far more complex because certain
rabbis enjoyed exemption from Roman taxes by virtue of their clergy status. Further, the rabbis
attempted to impose communal taxes for the support of rabbinic institutions-these were viewed
as required contributions by the rabbis themselves, yet Rome, and apparently rabbinic followers,
considered these duties entirely voluntary. See LEE I. LEVINE, THE RABBINIC CLASS OF ROMAN
PALESTINE IN LATE ANTIQUITY (1989).
18. See the study of rabbinic case law by my student, CATHERINE HEZSER, FORM, FUNCTION,
AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RABBINIC STORY IN YERUSHALMI NEZIOIN (1993).
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In the rabbinic era, there was no central authority in rabbinic Juda-
ism. While there was, in theory, a Sanhedrin to determine Jewish law
and a Patriarch in Palestine to interpret it (and in Babylonia, an exi-
larch with powers of rabbinic enforcement), in practice, each commu-
nal rabbi served as the arbiter of divine law for his flock. The two
points that this Article explores in detail are as follows: how the rabbis
arrogated the right to determine Divine Law, and how this power was
diffused among them.
Before the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in 70 C.E., Jewish
authority had coalesced around that central locus. 19 The biblical book
of Leviticus, in combination with Deuteronomy, made the Temple
into Judaism's central shrine, and so it gave the Jerusalem priesthood
the responsibility and power for carrying out the cultic functions of
divine law. There was then a central body to attend to the laws of the
Jews, the Sanhedrin.20 This Sanhedrin was under the powerful influ-
ence of the High Priest in the Temple. However, in the year 70 C.E.,
all of this came to an end.
Following the Temple's destruction, the rabbinic movement grew in
authority and power. One of its chief attractions was a shift away
from the cultic ritual of the Temple to a more hellenized emphasis on
academic study of text as a means of devotion to God. Divine will
came to be determined through the study of a text.2' This shift from
priesthood to Greco-Roman philosophical scholasticism allowed Juda-
ism to flourish without a central cult or centralized authority. Each
teacher/rabbi became an interpreter of divine law, and each commu-
nity of followers became an authentic repository of divine
revelation. 22
This diffusion of authority ran the risk of an ever-dissipated Judaism
with each community of followers doing "what was right in the eyes of
the Lord," yet each becoming its own separate religion. In part to
preclude this assimilation into the broader pagan culture, a grand coa-
lition was formed. 23 The rabbis who worked and studied together
chose to agree to disagree, yet nevertheless spread a broad umbrella
to be as inclusive a movement as possible. Still, from this rabbinic
19. For basic historic background on the era, see SHAVE J. D. COHEN, FROM THE MACCABEES
TO THE MISHNAH (1987). On the history and literature, see MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 2, at 71-
2.
20. See Huco MANTEL, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE SANHEDRIN (1961).
21. See Burton L. Visotzky, The Literature of the Rabbis, in MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 2.
22. "The words of these and the words of those are the words of the living God," see the
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Eruvin 13b, Gittin 6b, Berakhot 3b.
23. This coalition included rabbis and other leaders from before the destruction, such as mem-
bers of the Sanhedrin and Temple priests. See COHEN, supra note 19; LEVINE, supra note 17.
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perspective, there were Jewish movements that did not possess the
particular ritual and legal criteria necessary for inclusion. Such move-
ments either died out or declared their independence from the Jewish
world. 24
Part of the rabbinic adaptation of the Levitic cult was the assump-
tion that the law, which had previously applied to the priestly ruling
class, now applied to all Jews. 25 This was true of certain food taboos,26
as well as the Levitic injunctions for purity.27 These categories inter-
sect in a way that aptly illustrates how the rabbis continued priestly
manifestations of divine law even as they democratized it. What is
truly of note, however, is the way in which the rabbis not only arro-
gated for themselves the right to interpret divine law on what had
been a priestly injunction but the implications of that chutzpah
(hubris) on their interpretation of all other divine law.
II.
In theory, God gave the Law at Mount Sinai. In the rabbinic myth,
God not only gave the Ten Commandments but gave all Five Books of
Moses, the works of the Prophets, the Holy Writings (i.e., the entire
Hebrew Bible), rabbinic works, such as the Mishnah, all other
rabbinic rulings, rabbinic narrative, and "even what a senior disciple
would offer as a novel interpretation" to Moses at Sinai.28 But
whether these laws were truly divine law, had divine authority or, in-
deed, may have been entirely rabbinic, and therefore human, may be
well illustrated by turning to a question of ritual purity as it applies to
food taboos.
In Late Antiquity, cooking in an oven was not quite the same as it is
today. In Roman Palestine, clay ovens were the norm. They were
mounds of clay hollowed out in the center. At the bottom of the
hollow, a cook would place coals; atop those, the container of food to
be cooked and a straw or mud top would cover the aperture. The clay
would heat up and bake hard, and the householder would have a
24. Christianity is one example.
25. See MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 2, at 85-6.
26. What are referred to in rabbinic literature as shehitat hullin, profane (meaning outside the
Temple precincts) slaughter, now known as the "kosher" laws.
27. Which were originally enacted for the priesthood during service in the Temple, now de-
mocratized for all Jews of the strict rabbinic community.
28. Leviticus Rabbah 22:1-26:13. On rabbinic interpretation and the limits to it, see BURTON
VISOTZKY, FATHERS OF THE WORLD: ESSAYS IN RABBINIC AND PATRISTIC LITERATURES 28-41
(1995). For the various works cited, see Ora Horn Prouser, The Hebrew Bible, in MESOPOTA-
MIA, supra note 2, at 9-36 and Burton L. Visotzky, The Literature of the Rabbis, in MEsOPOTA-
MIA, supra note 2.
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lovely crock-pot. The problem with such an oven was that it could
become ritually impure through a variety of means-for example, a
bug or small lizard could crawl across the surface-and the only
means of purifying an earthenware oven was, alas, to smash it. Earth-
enware objects could not be made ritually fit once tainted.29
However, along came a fellow called Ochnai who invented, if you
will, a self-cleaning oven. By interposing layers of sand with layers of
clay, Ochnai felt he had developed a mode of assuring perpetual ritual
fitness. The sand would bake hard into glass, and neither sand nor
glass could contract ritual impurity. So Ochnai sought to bring his
oven to market as a great invention for the pious cooks of the rabbinic
community. Not only that, but he had a champion-a lobbyist if you
will-who was one of the most frequently cited rabbinic authorities:
Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus.30
Let me turn at this point to the Talmudic passage that tells this tale.
The story is set in the generation immediately following the destruc-
tion of Jerusalem. The Talmud teaches this story:
The other sages surrounded him like a serpent and continued
to declare such an oven ritually unfit. It is taught that on that
day Rabbi Eliezer offered every legal argument in the world,
but they did not accept them.
He then said, "If the law is the way I propose, let this carob
tree prove it." The carob tree uprooted itself and moved one
hundred cubits-although there are those who say it moved
four hundred cubits. They replied to him, "One cannot bring
a legal argument from a carob tree."
He then said, "If the law is according to my opinion, let this
aqueduct prove it." Whereupon the water in the aqueduct
reversed its flow! They replied to him, "One cannot bring a
legal argument from an aqueduct."
He then said, "If the law is according to my opinion, let the
walls of this academy prove it." The walls of the academy
began to incline dangerously inward.
29. The details of this type of earthenware oven and the ritual law applying to it described in
this paragraph may be found in YEHOSHUA BRAND, CERAMICS IN TALMUDIC LITERATURE
(1953) (Hebrew). The impurity these vessels could contract is spelled out in the biblical book of
Leviticus and in the Mishnaic tractates on Impurities, for which see Burton L. Visotzky, The
Literature of the Rabbis, in MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 2.
30. See Burton L. Visotzky, The Literature of the Rabbis, in MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 2, 74-
96. On Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, see H. L. STRACK & G. STEMBERGER, INTRODUCTION 10
THE TALMUD AND MIDRASH 77 (Markus Bockmuehl trans., 1991).
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But Rabbi Joshua rebuked them, "If the disciples of the sages
are debating the law with one another, what's it your busi-
ness?" They did not fall out of respect to Rabbi Joshua, but
nor did they resume their proper position out of respect to
Rabbi Eliezer. And [the Talmud adds with a wink] the walls
remain off-kilter to this very day!
Rabbi Eliezer returned to his argumentation, "If the law is
according to my opinion, let it be proven from heaven."
Whereupon a [Heavenly] Voice came forth and proclaimed,
"What do you have against Rabbi Eliezer? The law is always
according to his opinion."
Rabbi Joshua stood up on his feet and quoted, "It is not in
Heaven!" (Deuteronomy 30:12)
[The Talmud now asks a question of commentary on the
verse,] What is the meaning of "it is not in heaven"? Rabbi
Jeremiah explained, The Torah was already given at Sinai, so
we do not attend to heavenly voices. For You have already
written in the Torah at Mt. Sinai, "follow the majority."'31 (Ex-
odus 23:2)
Before this delicious Talmudic narrative is drawn to a close, some
commentary is in order. The lobbyist Rabbi Eliezer offered every le-
gal argument, but could not sway his colleagues. Because neither the
law nor the facts seemed to be with him, Rabbi Eliezer turned to di-
vine assistance. Rabbi Joshua was one of the senior jurists of his gen-
eration.32 His authority was sufficient, as we see, to prevent the very
walls of the court from collapsing. It should be noted that the walls
themselves were experts on the law. Because they had been listening
to arguments for generations, the walls knew which way to lean. But
Rabbi Joshua would have none of it. His position was that in the
court, the walls were there to hold up the ceiling and not to be in-
volved in any form of religious display. He asked the walls quite
pointedly, "What's it your business?" This is, I believe, what Ameri-
can jurists mean when they speak of "the wall of separation."
Referring back to our story, Rabbi Joshua, in his zeal, quotes Scrip-
ture to God and consciously mangles the meaning of the text. He tells
God that the Torah is not in Heaven. But in its context in Deuteron-
omy, that verse is an exhortation to the Israelites: "Surely the Torah,
which I command you today, is not too difficult nor beyond your
31. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 59b. See my treatment of the theological implica-
tions of this passage in READING THE BOOK: MAKING THE BIBLE A TIMELESS TEXT 51-6 (1991).
32. See STRACK & STEMBERGER, supra note 30, at 77-8.
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reach. It is not in heaven that you should say, 'who can go up to the
heavens and get it for us' . . . no, the thing is very close to you." Rabbi
Joshua takes what is offered as a feeble human excuse not to do Torah
as his permission to interpret with a vengeance. Rabbi Joshua argues,
"The Torah is not in Heaven. God, mind Your own business. We
rabbis are now the arbiters of divine law. We do not listen to voices
from Heaven."
To exacerbate this chutzpah and wholly shatter any notion of the
strict construction of original intent, Rabbi Jeremiah invokes, as it
were, the rabbinic Rules of Civil Procedure by quoting the Torah right
back to God yet again. In this anything but civil exchange, the good
rabbi reminds God that rabbis vote by majority rule, not by divine
intervention. Yet here, the verse of Scripture is bent to its breaking
point. Exodus 23:2, within its context, means something quite differ-
ent than what the Talmud has pretended it to say. In context, the
biblical verse reads as follows: "You shall NOT follow the majority to
do evil."'33 I submit that it is reading somewhat out of context to sim-
ply drop the word "not" out of a divine enactment in order to infer a
rabbinic ruling.
Of course, the narrative I have recounted above is rabbinic myth.
Indeed, it qualifies as fantasy. I suspect that this fantasy might also
find a home within the legal world. Imagine arguing before the
United States Supreme Court, being harangued by justices interrupt-
ing with hard, aggressive questions, when a voice comes from heaven
to ask, What do you have against learned counsel? Is not the law al-
ways according to his (or her) interpretation? As I said, sheer fantasy.
The Talmudic story actually has an ending, even two. The first end-
ing is the happy ending. The second ending is more difficult to catego-
rize. The Talmud text picks up where the above myth left off,
immediately after Rabbi Jeremiah invokes his truncated citation of
Exodus, "Follow the majority."
Rabbi Nathan once had the opportunity to consult with [the
angelic prophet] Elijah,34 he asked him, "What did The
Blessed Holy One do at that moment?" To which Elijah re-
sponded, "Why God chuckled and said, 'My children have
out-argued Me, My children have out-argued Me! ''35
33. Exodus 23:2 (emphasis added).
34. Elijah is reported in the Bible as having ascended to heaven in a fiery chariot. 2 Kings 2:1-
2:12. He is presumed in rabbinic lore to have translated into an angelic being who makes the
rounds of human affairs, helping out here and there, answering difficult rabbinic queries, attend-
ing Passover seders, circumcision ceremonies, and the like.
35. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 31.
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Here, too, we are in the realm of legal fantasy. The rabbis have
defeated the very source of law and God is pleased at how clever the
rabbis are. God approves. Does this not mean that the rabbis are the
absolute arbiters of divine law? God no longer has a voice because
what the rabbis say goes. Only the rabbis can determine the intent of
divine law, even if it is by rules that consciously break it.
There is a second, more ambiguous ending to the Oven-of-Ochnai
narrative. The Talmud reports that Rabbi Eliezer may have been out-
voted, but still believed himself to be correct-did not God support
his argument? The sages responded to Eliezer's persistence in ignor-
ing the authority of their court by burning all of the items he had
declared ritually fit and by excommunicating him from their commu-
nity.36 The head of that court, Rabban Gamaliel,37 prayed to God
regarding his court's severe reaction to Eliezer's apparent contempt:
"Master of the Universe, it is revealed and known to You that I did
not do this to protect my own honor, nor for my family's honor, but
for Your honor-that dissent and division not increase among the
Jews. "38
It seems that the rabbis not only arrogate the power of interpreta-
tion but also draw in their umbrella somewhat. Dissent and division
cannot persist in the face of a majority ruling. One may be allowed to
hold divergent minority opinions, but when those opinions-particu-
larly in the generation after the destruction-threaten the rule of law
and the very court system, then the rabbis will excommunicate even
one of their most prominent brethren. Yes, the rabbis have authority
and yes, the authority will be much more diffuse than it had been, but
there are limits. The very myth of divine law requires sanctions for
those who threaten its dissipation and assimilation under the iron grip
of Roman secular rule.
III.
As I suggested above, the rabbis based the claim for their authority
upon their own peculiar interpretation of the events at Mt. Sinai.
They presumed that God gave oral interpretation along with the writ-
ten canon of the Torah. This would be a little like saying that because
we are "one nation under God," every part of our American jurispru-
dence was revealed to the Founding Fathers in their drafting of the
Constitution-not just the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, but
36. Id.
37. See STRACK & STEMBERGER, supra note 30, at 76-8.
38. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 31.
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every subsequent amendment, every legislated statute, and every
court's decision were revealed to the Founding Fathers in 1789. 39
The implications of this bizarre scenario are not only clear to us
now but were clear to the rabbis who perpetuated the myth them-
selves. In another Talmudic narrative, they imagine Moses ascending
Sinai to receive the Law:
Rav Yehudah quoted Rav, When Moses ascended on High [to
receive the Torah] he found God sitting and calligraphing
crownlets upon the letters.40
Moses said to God, "Master of the Universe, who is staying
Your hand [from giving us the Torah unadorned]?"
God replied, "There will be a man many generations in the
future whose name is Aqiba ben Joseph, 41 who will exegeti-
cally infer mountains of laws from each and every jot and
tittle." 42
Moses said, "Master of the Universe, will You show him to
me?"
God said, "Turn around."
Moses [did so and found himself in Rabbi Aqiba's court. He]
went and sat in the eighth row, 43 but could not understand
what it was they were talking about. He grew weak with in-
comprehension. But then they reached a certain matter and
Rabbi Aqiba's disciples pressed him, "But Rabbi, where is
your authority for this ruling?"
Aqiba said to them, "This is the law given to Moses at Sinai!"
39. 1 should note that the rabbis did not share our system of government. In their courts in
particular, the judges cross-examined witnesses. There were no lawyers, per se. Further, it ap-
pears that there were circumstances where a Sanhedrin ruled, but they acted as a great court (of
70 plus members) rather than as a legislature. In short, most rabbinic law (as opposed to law
determined to be of biblical origin) was case law. Despite the clear distinction between rabbinic
law and biblical law, the rabbis considered both the former and latter as having divine authority.
40. Torah scrolls have such calligraphic adornments on certain letters to this very day.
41. One of the great late-first, early-second century rabbinic legalists. A contemporary of
Rabbi Eliezer.
42. Aqiba was known for his methodology of reading law, perhaps into the text, based upon
his assumption that the Torah was a divine code which required a radical hermeneutic not other-
wise applicable to human literature. See BURTON L. VISOTZKY, Jots and Tittles: On Scriptural
Interpretation in Rabbinic and Patristic Literatures, in FATHERS OF THE WORLD: ESSAYS IN
RABBINIC AND PATRISTRIC LITERATURES 28-40 (1995).
43. Students traditionally sat from brightest to dimmest. Thus, Moses is both literally and
figuratively at the back of the class.
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Moses felt better. But when he came back before the Blessed
Holy One he asked, "Master of the Universe, You have a man
such as he, and yet You give the Torah to the likes of me?"
God replied, "Silence, this is My plan. 44
The implications of this story for rabbinic interpretation of divine
law are most instructive. This narrative seems to imply that by the
first or second generation after the destruction of the Temple, rabbinic
reading of divine law had become sufficiently complex that even
Moses could not follow its intricacies. Moses sits in the rear of the
classroom, intellectually too weak or unprepared to appreciate the
rabbinic dialectic. When Aqiba's students press him on a point of law,
Aqiba resorts to that age-old response, which is the equivalent of say-
ing to a recalcitrant child, "because I'm the dad, that's why!" By say-
ing the ruling is what was given to Moses at Sinai, Aquiba is saying
there can be no dispute. The divine law has been handed down as a
fait accompli, there is no room for either argument or refutation. It is
divine law literally-what God spoke to Moses at Sinai.
Of course the rabbis knew only too well that their own discourse
was no such thing. They were clearly aware of the radical nature of
Aqiban's exegesis. His inferences of law from calligraphic adorn-
ments could hardly be construed as strict construction; indeed, his col-
leagues wondered if his constructions were within the pale of
permissible hermeneutics. Their claim against him was that "the law
must be interpreted according to the rules of human discourse. '45
Fundamentalist interpretation, or interpretation by fiat, was not nec-
essarily a correct reading of divine law. By saying, "It is the law given
to Moses at Sinai, ' 46 Aqiba is asserting a prerogative that he really
does not have. He cannot know what happened on Sinai. His asser-
tion really means, "My opinion trumps everything."
This is not the normative mode of discourse for rabbinic dialectic.
Indeed, Moses' own weakness, his dizzy incomprehension of what is
going on in Aqiba's academy, may be our narrator's way of expressing
his disapproval at such a presumptuous invocation of divine law. It is
as though the rabbis say, "Let us not confuse the myth of our author-
ity with the reality of our legal process. We claim divine authority, for
otherwise we have very little recourse within this secular society. But
we employ hellenistic hermeneutics and legal principles alongside our
44. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Menahot 29b. See READING THE BOOK, supra note 31, at 49-51.
See also, VISOTZKY, supra note 42, at 28-40.
45. SIFRE NUMBERS #112, 121. See also, VISOTZKY, supra note 42, at 32, 40.
46. See supra notes 42 and accompanying text.
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inherited Jewish semitic principles to determine what we call divine
will." The narrative may set the myth for the nomos, but it is not the
law itself. The law must be determined by a much more practiced
human give and take.
Yet even as this Talmudic narrative critiques Aqiba's judicial activ-
ism, it recognizes two issues. First, whether by Aqiban method or by
other methods, the law in fact has changed since Sinai. There is his-
torical development within the legal system. Society changes, and so
divine law must evolve. The very critique of Aqiba's presumption
seems to be a critique of overly-conservative fundamentalist reading.
There cannot be strict construction because true Authorial intent is
unknowable. Further, the rabbis reject divine interference with their
own attempts to apply the law in each generation. Even if it were
knowable, they would prefer not to have any version of divine law but
the one that they themselves determine.
The second issue is more ironic: a bitter recognition of the necessity
for myth and narrative to allow the rule of law to persist within a
community. For even as the story criticizes Aqiban excess, it upholds
the myth of divine authority for rabbinic rulings. Moses witnesses the
happenings in Aqiba's court at the very moment that he ascends on
High to receive the Torah. Within the narrative world of the story,
what happens in Aqiba's court-the argument and Aqiba's trumping
of his students by trumpeting that "this is the law given to Moses at
Sinai,"-is indeed "the law given to Moses at Sinai." Because Moses
is on Sinai when the dialogue takes place, Aqiba's assertions are, by
definition, the law given to Moses at Sinai.
So, Aqiba can be criticized for radical hermeneutic, for pushing his
constructions too far beyond the pale of accepted legal methodology.
Yet at the same time, the Talmudic narrator (perhaps Rav Yehudah or
his teacher Rav47) ironically maintains the myth that the rabbis speak
with the authority of divine law. If this were not paradox enough, this
story serves to underscore a broader paradox about the diffusion of
rabbinic authority: the story of Moses on Sinai viewing Aqiba's pro-
nouncement of authority implies a type of apostolicity 48 (i.e., a direct
and unbroken chain of tradition from Moses to Aqiba). Indeed, an
47. Yehudah is Babylonian, flourished around 300 C.E. Rav was a Palestinian who moved to
Babylonia there to found a system of study and interpretation based on the Palestinian rabbinic
compendia. Ray flourished around 225 C.E.
48. I use this term from church doctrine, for it is applicable and convenient here. See, JOHN
NORMAN DAVIDSON KELLY, EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES 35-47 (1958). Such monolithic au-
thority was invoked in the rabbinic community as late as the end of the Tenth Century by Ray
Sherira Gaon who wrote an authoritative Epistle from Baghdad to Kairawan, North Africa,
invoking the apostolicity of rabbinic tradition against the Karaite threat.
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explicit chain of tradition exists in rabbinic literature, not in regard to
Aqiba but rather his contemporary Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai.49
As mentioned above, Aqiba's position was well respected, but not
unchallengedP0 There were many rabbinic opinions in addition to
Aqiba's. Some followed Aqiba, and some followed his primary inter-
locutor, Rabbi Ishmael. 51 Despite the invocation of divine authority,
the reality of both Roman Realpolitik, as well as rabbinic legal theory,
yielded a broad diversity of rabbinic opinions. There was no central
authority in the rabbinic community. Rather the subsidiary myth was
that "this opinion and that opinion are the words of the living God.
52
The diffusion of authority among many different rabbis made an ef-
fective check and balance to authoritarianism, even as it ran the risk
of centrifugal force devolving into chaos and assimilation.
IV.
These two abstract poles are effectively reified in the greater para-
dox of the rabbinic myth of divine law. Throughout their literature,
the rabbis insist that God gave the Torah at Sinai53-and that the au-
thority to pronounce divine law devolves inexorably to the rabbis.
The primary manifestation of the myth is One God gives one law to
one authority who hands it down undiluted. Yet the historic reality
was that although the One spoke at Sinai, many interpret divine law
with many differing interpretations.
The myth of unified, even unique authority becomes, in reality, a
diffusion of authority across various loci within the rabbinic commu-
nity. As long as there can be no centralized authority in the rabbinic
world due to their real existence within a secular society, there can be
no single unchallenged interpretation of divine law. Therefore, the
myth of divine law in secular society carries with it the limitation of
authoritative rendering of divine law. This pluralism of competing au-
thorities and competing Jewish communities' participation in revela-
tion persists to this very day. While few of the American Jewish
communities continue to actively invoke the myth of divine law today,
49. This "chain of tradition" was in keeping with hellenistic works of the period establishing
new scholars over the various philosophical schools. See Elie Bikermann, La Chaine de la Tradi-
tion Pharisaienne, 59 REVUE BIBLIQUE 23 (1952).
50. See VISOTZKY, supra note 42, at 32-40.
51. Who had suggested that interpretation of the Torah must follow the rules of human dis-
course. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 22.
53. The Torah may concur, but it may also be that the rabbinic (indeed, also the Church's)
reading of the Bible, for millennia, forces this reading into the text.
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all assert some form of divine authority54 for the authenticity of their
communal apprehension of divine will.
Thus far, I have spoken to my expertise, rabbinic literature. I hope
that these remarks have been of interest, but I am aware that they
may have been more directed at the theologians in the audience than
to the lawyers. Therefore, I turn to the implications it may have for
Church/State issues. While the rabbis suffered certain impotence
within secular society, they did have some controlling legal authority
within their own communities. Rome, for its part, was quite content
to allow the rabbis authority as long as it did not interfere with the
orderly collection of taxes and did not presume to encroach on those
areas that were perceived to be exclusively the sovereignty of the
Imperium.
What about our own government? We are a nation of laws, and we
celebrate the rule of law. We, too, invoke divine authority, even as we
eschew any specific divinity. Our polytheism mirrors that of pagan
Rome. We even share their distaste for atheism, although of late, our
courts have professed some protection for that minority as well. I
think all of this is good, but what is not good is this: if the rabbis can
arrogate power under the cover of divine law, how much more so (a
fortiori) can those religious leaders who are not a powerless minority
do so in our own age?
I believe that we cannot afford to bring any more divine authority
into our court system nor into any other area of our government. To
do so would be a dual encroachment. First, it would encroach upon
our Constitution-the same First Amendment invoked at the outset
of this essay, but beyond the first five words. Bringing more religion
into our ostensibly secular government, whether it is Christianity or
any other religion undermines the rule of law. Second, it would be an
encroachment upon the freedom of the varied religions that make up
our great secular society. The result of a marriage of "divine law"
with our "secular society" would be a form of "tyranny of the major-
ity," even if it is only a historic majority that no longer holds sway
demographically, but nevertheless wields a dangerously large political
influence.
I wish to close by reflecting on the paradox I noted about the myth
of divine law. For the rabbis, the myth was a monolithic law handed
down in apostolic fashion. The reality, ironically, was a pluralistic
community with diffuse centers of local authority. The American my-
thos is similarly paradoxical, although quite the opposite of the
54. One example is God acting through history.
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rabbinic myth of divine law. America is founded on the myth of de-
mocracy. Many differing sources give our government its authority.
Whether the myth that we are a nation of hundreds of millions of
enfranchised citizens or the myth that we are fifty United States
banded together into one federal government is true, the flow of au-
thority is inverse from that of divine authority. Divine authority is top
down, while American democracy is bottom up. Divine law results in
diffuse and pluralistic interpretations. Again, paradoxically, secular
democratic society results in one high court that proclaims one law for
this diverse, diffuse, and pluralistic society.
The inverse relationship of these two myths-divine law and secular
society-should serve as a warning that Church and State must go
their separate ways. The tolerance of the State for the various mani-
festations of the Church-which includes synagogues and mosques, as
well as the other temples of the rainbow of religions in America-
must also be matched by the tolerance of those Churches for the secu-
lar society upon which our State is founded.
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